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THE DEATH OF DISCOUNT ONLINE RETAILING? RESALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE AFTER LEEGIN V. PSKS

Erich M. Fabricius'
In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v. PSKS, Inc., the
Supreme Court announced a shift in the law of minimum resale
price maintenance by overruling the longstanding per se
prohibition of these policies. The new rule of reason standardis
more permissive of these minimum resale price maintenance
agreements and as a result their use is likely to increase.
Increased use of minimum resale price maintenance would harm
online discounters competingfor customersprimarily on the basis
of price. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how many
manufacturers will actually implement these policies, as there are
both practicaland economic disincentives to implementation.
I. INTRODUCTION

Online retailing is a fast growing sector of the United States
economy, with online retail sales growing an average of 27.3% per
year from 2000 to 2005, compared to 4.3% per year for the overall
retail industry.2 A number of factors drive e-commerce, such as
convenience and information availability, 3 but a highly efficient
pricing market that often delivers lower prices than traditional

' J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2009.
2 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATs 3 (2007), http://www.census.gov/eos/www/
2005/2005reportfinal.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
3 Tofiita Perea y Monsuw6, Benedict G.C. Dellaert & Ko de Ruyter, What
Drives Consumers To Shop Online? A Literature Review, 15 INT'L J. SERVICE
INDUSTRY MGMT. 102, 116 (2004) (listing several factors motivating consumers
to shop online); Mary Wolfinbarger & Mary C. Gilly, Shopping Online for
Freedom, Control, and Fun, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 2001, at 34, 35
(attributes of goal-oriented shoppers).
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stores is a particular strength of e-commerce.4 Online stores have
been able to compete vigorously amongst themselves based on
price,' aided by legal rules prohibiting restrictions on their ability
to set prices freely.
Since online retailing began, minimum resale price
maintenance agreements prohibiting retailers from selling a
product below a given price have been considered illegal per se
under Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co.' Under

this per se approach, no circumstances exist that would justify
these types of agreements.' While certain tactics gave suppliers
limited control over retail prices,' the legal risk associated with
those tactics prevented widespread use.' The absence of minimum

4 See Erik Brynjolfsson & Michael D. Smith, Frictionless Commerce? A
Comparison ofInternet and Conventional Retailers,46 MGMT. Scl. 563, 564-65
(2000).
5Yannis Bakos, The Emerging Landscapefor Retail E-Commerce, J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 2001, at 69, 71 (noting "that on-line markets will have more
intense price competition, resulting in lower profits as well as the passing to
consumers of savings from lower cost structures"). But cf Fabio Ancarani &
Venkatesh Shankar, Price Levels and Price Dispersion Within and Across
Multiple Retailer Types: Further Evidence and Extension, 32 J. ACAD.
MARKETING SCI. 176, 185 (2004) (observing lower posted prices online but
seeing signs of non-price differentiation).
6 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911); see infra text accompanying notes 32-36.
7 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705,
2712 (2007) (noting the per se rule required the exclusion of evidence pricing
policies had procompetitive effects).
8 See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (establishing the
permissibility of unilateral price agreements, where a supplier announces a
minimum price without seeking agreement from retailers, and enforces the price
by discontinuing dealing with non-complying retailers); see also infra text
accompanying notes 37-40.
9 See, e.g., Howard P. Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance Controversy:
Beyond the Conventional Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 91 n.76 (1994)
(noting the limits of the Colgate rule's value); Brief of PING, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9-10, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480),
2007 WL 173680 [hereinafter PING Brief] (describing great efforts undertaken
to minimize risk a pricing policy could be found bilateral).
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resale price maintenance has aided the growth of discount retailing
in the last twenty-five years.o
In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.," the
Supreme Court held that minimum resale price maintenance
agreements should be evaluated for anticompetitive effects under a
rule of reason standard instead of the prior standard of per se
illegality. 2 The rule of reason standard is more permissive than its
predecessor, and the Leegin Court makes it clear that
circumstances can exist that would justify use of minimum resale
price maintenance agreements." The Court's acceptance of these
agreements could result in discount online retailers losing their
essential ability to compete based on price. 4 Yet, even though
online retailers will more likely be impacted by resale price
maintenance agreements under the new standard, there is no reason
to conclude these agreements will become widespread in the
marketplace. 5

10 See Susan Strasser, Woolworth to Wal-Mart: Mass Merchandisingand the
Changing Culture of Consumption, in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-

FIRST CENTURY CAPITALISM 31, 49 (Nelson Lichtenstein ed., 2006) (noting that

increased legal hostility towards resale price maintenance in the 1970s
"legitimized the pricing practices of Wal-Mart and other discount stores and was
essential to their further expansion").
1 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).

12 Id. at 2710.
13Id. at 2715-20; see infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. Following Leegin,
consumer groups have indicated concern over pricing online. See, e.g., Supreme
Court Lets Manufacturers Set Minimum Prices, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, July
2007, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/money/news/2007/07/supreme-courtlets-manufacturers-set-minimum-prices/overview/0807_supreme court decision
ov.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
Members of Congress have also raised alarm, introducing a bill on October 30,
2007, to overturn the Leegin decision. See 153 CONG. REc. S13582-Sl3583
(daily ed. Oct. 30, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kohl) (explaining need to overturn
Leegin in that "millions of consumers have benefited from an explosion of retail
competition from new large discounters ... on the Internet"). The bill as
introduced, S. 2261, would amend the Sherman Act by expressly banning
vertical agreements setting minimum prices. Discount Pricing Consumer
Protection Act, S. 2261, 110th Cong. (2007).
15 See discussion infra Part I1I.B.
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BACKGROUND

A. Leegin: OrdinaryDispute and DoctrinalShift
Leegin was brought as a private antitrust suit alleging resale
price maintenance in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act under the
Dr. Miles per se rule. 6 This type of suit is relatively common
under this body of law." The defendant, Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. ("Leegin") produces premium leather goods under
the "Brighton" brand name.'" Leegin requires its retailers to sell at
or above a particular minimum retail price as a condition of
continued wholesale purchasing." Retail stores operated by PSKS,
Inc. ("PSKS") began discounting below these prices, and Leegin
refused to supply its goods to PSKS because they refused to stop
discounting.2 0 At trial, Leegin defended its minimum retail price
practice by defining it as a unilateral policy, permitted under the
Colgate doctrine,2' as opposed to a bilateral agreement.22
However, the jury found Leegin's pricing plan to be in fact a
bilateral agreement, so the Colgate unilateral pricing exception
offered Leegin no protection from the Dr. Miles rule of per se
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712.
Brief for Anderson Economic Group, L.L.C. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 7, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 621852
[hereinafter Anderson Economic Group Brief] (noting "[m]any RPM cases ...
are brought by private parties"). See generally Roger D. Blair, Jill Boylston
Herndon & John E. Lopatka, Resale Price Maintenance and the Private
Antitrust Plaintiff 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 657 (2005) (discussing private antitrust
suits in the realm of resale price maintenance).
8
1 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2710.
'9 Id. at 2711 (describing Leegin's "Brighton Retail Pricing and Promotion
Policy").
16

17

20

Id.

See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (recognizing that
right of manufacturers to choose whom to deal with allowed them to stop selling
to retailers not heeding their price recommendations); see also infra notes 37-40
and accompanying text.
22 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712.
Leegin also attempted to present a procompetitive justification at trial, but the trial court excluded the expert testimony
as irrelevant given the per se rule. See PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc., No. 2:03-CV-107, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30414, at *1415 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 25, 2004).
21
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illegality.23 On appeal, Leegin argued that minimum resale price
maintenance can have procompetitive effects and therefore should
not be considered illegal per se.24
The Supreme Court agreed with Leegin that there was no
longer justification for the Dr. Miles rule that minimum resale
price maintenance is illegal per se, and held that these agreements
should be judged by a rule of reason standard instead. 25 The Court
further held that the rationale for using a per se standard in Dr.
Miles is flawed, and instead required an economic analysis to
determine whether pricing restraints are so likely to have an
anticompetitive effect as to justify an irrefutable per se
presumption. 26 The Court continued by analyzing the economics
of minimum resale price maintenance, noting that "economics
literature is replete with procompetitive justifications," 27 and as
such, the presumption of anticompetitive effect necessary to
support a per se rule cannot be established.28 In overruling Dr.
Miles, the Court rationalized its failure to follow precedent by
explaining that "the Sherman Act [is] a common-law statute" that
must adapt to "the dynamics of present economic conditions."29
B. Development ofResale Price MaintenanceLaw: Moving
Towards Leegin
The Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1, provides that
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is ... illegal.""o Early Sherman Act
cases established that horizontal price agreements, where two
competing companies agree on a price to charge, were illegal
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712.
PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 171 F. App'x 464, 46667 (5th Cir. 2006).
25
26 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2725.
Id. at 2713-14 (noting "more recent jurisprudence has rejected the
rationales
on which Dr. Miles was based").
27
Id. at 2714.
28
Id. at 2717-18.
23

24

29

Id. at 2720.

30

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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The Supreme Court in
regardless of claims of reasonableness.'
Co.n held that the
&
Sons
D.
Park
v.
John
Co.
Dr. Miles Medical
Sherman Act also applied to vertical resale price agreements,
where a retailer and its supplier agree on a price." The Dr. Miles
Court found these resale price maintenance agreements
comparable to "a general restraint upon alienation,"34 and therefore
illegal per se." Under this standard, the arguable benefits of a
price arrangement are irrelevant and the arrangement is irrefutably
presumed anticompetitive."
Given the potential harshness of the Dr. Miles rule, the
Supreme Court carved out an exception in United States v. Colgate
& Co." Under the Colgate doctrine, the Court allows use of
unilateral resale price maintenance, where the manufacturer acts
alone to set retail prices without any agreements and enforces the
prices by discontinuing sales to non-conforming retailers." More
recent cases have reaffirmed and expounded the Colgate rule.39
2

H. PAGE, KINTNER FEDERAL ANTITRUST
11.17 (2d ed. 2002).
32 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
33 Id. at 409
(holding "the restrictions sought to be enforced ... were
invalid .. . under the [Sherman Act]").
34 Id. at 404.
3
1Id. at 409.
36 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712
(2007) (noting with approval lower court holding that Dr. Miles "per se rule
rendered irrelevant any procompetitive justifications").
37 250 U.S. 300 (1919). See generally BAURER & PAGE, supra note 31, § 12.5
(discussion of Colgate doctrine).
38 Colgate, 250 U.S. at 306-07.
3 See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding
termination of a retailer for not following price list was permissible following
the demand for such action by a second retailer); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (holding termination of a retailer
following complaints from rival retailers was insufficient to establish concerted
non-unilateral action, but rather "[t]here must be evidence that tends to exclude
the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting
independently"). See generally 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
3'

JOSEPH P. BAUER & WILLIAM

LAW §

AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
ANTITRUST LAW:
1623d (2d ed. 2004) (discussing Monsanto decision and
APPLICATION
enforcement of unilateral policies); BAURER & PAGE, supra note 31, § 12.6

(discussing standards for finding concerted or unilateral behavior post-Colgate).
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While Colgate has provided an avenue for businesses to legally
implement resale price maintenance, policies claiming to be
unilateral, and therefore falling under the Colgate rule, are often
disputed as to whether they are truly unilateral or actually represent
proscribed bilateral agreements.4 0 Frequently courts have struggled
to ascertain the existence of agreements and whether those
agreements amounted to minimum resale price agreements.4
For several decades, from the 1930s until 1975, minimum
resale price maintenance was legal in several states under the
respective state fair trade laws, first exclusively in intrastate
commerce, and then also in interstate commerce under the MillerTydings Act of 1937.42 Over time though, fair trade laws gradually
lost favor and began being repealed by states, culminating in the
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975 that expressly repealed the
Miller-Tydings Act and ended state-legalized minimum resale
price maintenance.4 3 The free trade period is notable as it provided
empirical data useful for analyzing the impacts of minimum resale
price maintenance.44
Following that period, the Supreme Court, in reviewing
agreements between manufacturers and retailers regarding nonprice constraints or maximum resale prices, moved away from per
se prohibitions to case-by-case analysis based on a rule of reason
standard. When a manufacturer restricts a retailer in areas other

40 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762 (observing that the distinction
between
unilateral and concerted action is "often ... difficult to apply in practice"); see,
e.g., Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712 (noting Leegin and PSKS disagreed on whether
the pricing policy was unilateral or bilateral).
41 See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 39,
1623e (trouble evaluating
reseller terminations in context of complaints from competing resellers).
42

Louis

ALTMAN

&

MALLA

POLLACK,

COMPETITION, TRADMARKS & MONOPOLIES
THOMAS

R.

OVERSTREET, JR.,

]A

CALLMANN

ON

UNFAIR

§ 6:3 (4th ed. 2007); see also

RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE:

THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 4-5 (1983)

ECONOMIC

(describing fair trade and

Miller-Tydings Act).
43 ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 42, § 6:4.
44 See OVERSTREET, supra note 42, at 106 (using fair trade data to analyze

resale price maintenance impacts).
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than setting prices, 45 this is a non-price vertical restraint. In
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,4 6 the Court held that
such non-price vertical restraints were not per se illegal under the
Sherman Act.47 Another type of vertical agreement is a maximum
resale price agreement, which establishes the highest price that a
retailer may set. In State Oil Co. v. Khan,48 the Court overruled the
per se rule and held that vertical maximum price agreements
should be judged under a rule of reason framework. 49 The Khan
Court began by holding that per se rules should be used only when
the restraint has a "predictable and pernicious anticompetitive
effect."o The Court went on to determine that maximum price
agreements do not have a clear anticompetitive effect"' and found
stare decisis should not impede the evolving interpretation of the
Sherman Act.52 This rationale in Khan directly foreshadows the
later Leegin analysis."
III. ANALYSIS

A. Rule ofReason Standard: ProvidingGreaterAccess to Resale
PriceMaintenance
The former rule of per se illegality for minimum resale price
maintenance resulted in uniform outcomes with all bilateral
minimum price agreements being held illegal regardless of
justification.5 4 In contrast, the new rule of reason standard relies
Examples of such restraints are geographic sales area restrictions and classbased customer allocations. See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 39,
600b, at 4; BAURER & PAGE, supra note 31, § 12.9.
45

46

433 U.S. 36 (1977).

id. at 57-59 (holding that the per se prohibition on non-price vertical
restraints is overruled, as such restraints lack the necessary certain
anticompetitive effect).
48 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
49
Id. (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)).
50
Id. at 10.
5' Id. at 14-19.
52 Id. at 20-22.
5 See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
54 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712
(2007) (noting the per se rule required the exclusion of evidence of procompetitive effects in pricing policies).
47
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on case-by-case judgments." Accordingly, the impact of the new
rule will depend on how the lower courts apply it." In the Leegin
opinion, the Supreme Court gave some indications of what it
viewed as the boundaries of proper behaviors 7 and provided a
general summary of the rule:
Under [the rule of reason], the factfinder weighs all of the
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
competition. Appropriate factors to take into account include specific
information about the relevant business and the restraint's history,
nature, and effect. Whether the businesses involved have market power
is a further, significant consideration. In its design and function the
rule distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect[s] that
are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that
are in the consumer's best interest.5 8

The rule of reason standard has been extensively applied in
Sherman Act § 1 cases concerning other sorts of restraints." These
shifts to a rule of reason from a per se standard in the judgment of
non-price vertical restraints are especially helpful in anticipating
how the rule will be implemented in the minimum resale price
maintenance context."o In analyzing the Leegin rule of reason, it is
appropriate to begin with a review of case law applying the new
decision.
1. Early Indicators in Post-Leegin Lower CourtDecisions
In the months following the Leegin decision, the federal courts
have begun applying the decision in antitrust cases. The U.S.
5 Id. (stating that under the rule of reason, "the factfinder weighs all of the
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited" (emphasis added) (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977))).
56 See infra Part III.A.1 (surveying early lower court decisions); see also infra
Part III.A.3 (reviewing application of rule of reason in other vertical restraint
contexts).
5 See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
58 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712-13 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
59 Id. at 2711 (calling the rule of reason "the usual standard applied to
determine if there is a violation of [Sherman Act] § 1"). See generally BAURER
& PAGE, supra note 31, § 9.6 (situations of use of rule of reason versus per se
standard).
60 See infra Part III.A.3.
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District Court for the Southern District of Ohio applied the Leegin
rule to an allegation of vertical price fixing in Total Benefits
PlanningAgency Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield.' In
Total Benefits, the court held that the plaintiff failed to properly
state an antitrust claim and therefore dismissed the claim, but in the
process cited a test for applying the rule of reason.62 The U.S.
District Court for the District of Alaska also recently relied on
Leegin for the proposition that vertical price restraints must pass a
rule of reason analysis, but the court did not apply this analysis to
its end conclusion, finding the behavior in the case did not rise to
the level of resale price maintenance." Given the results of these
cases, no substantial conclusions on lower court application can be
drawn until a case presents conduct previously proscribed under
the per se rule, permitting the rule of reason to alter the outcome of
the case. Nevertheless, we can turn to the Leegin decision for
guidance on how the rule should be applied.
2. Guidance on the Rule ofReason Providedby Leegin
As reviewed in this section, the Supreme Court in Leegin made
several statements explaining how the rule of reason should be
applied to minimum resale price maintenance. On an economic
policy level, the Court explained three procompetitive effects that
" No. 1:05CV519, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53862, at *14 (S.D. Ohio July 25,
2007).
62 Id. at *16
("[T]he plaintiff must prove .. . (1) that the defendants
contracted, combined, or conspired; (2) that the scheme produced
anticompetitive effects; (3) that the restraint affected relevant product and
geographic markets; (4) that the object of the scheme and the conduct resulting
from it was illegal; and (5) that the scheme was a proximate cause of the
plaintiffs antitrust injury." (citing Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone County, 440
F.3d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 2006)). The Expert Masonry court went on to note that
once the plaintiff has made this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant to demonstrate a procompetitive effect. Expert Masonry, 440 F.3d at
343. If a procompetitive effect is shown, the plaintiff can show that there are
less restrictive means to attain the same procompetitive end. Id. This test is
more procedurally oriented, but compares favorably to the rule of reason
summary in Leegin, particularly to the key attribute of demonstrated
anticompetitive effect. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
63 Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Cendant Corp., No. 3:03-CV-00029-TMB, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55474, at *73-85 (D. Alaska July 27, 2007).
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can justify use of minimum resale price maintenance.6 4 First,
minimum resale price maintenance can be used to "encourage[]
retailers to invest in services . . . or promotional efforts that aid the

manufacturer's position as against rival manufacturers."" Second,
restrictions can prevent free riding, which occurs when the
customers of low-cost, low-service retailers obtain benefits from
services of a high cost retailer without paying for them.66 Lastly,
minimum resale price maintenance can facilitate the incubation of
new products on the market, allowing investment in product
reputation by preventing fierce price wars.67 Manufacturers who
are able to justify their resale price maintenance programs using
one of these three recognized procompetitive effects will have a
higher likelihood of having their programs upheld under a rule of
reason analysis.68
The Court went further to explain situational factors indicative
of minimum resale price maintenance policies that are either
proper or improper under the rule of reason." These factors
include market power of manufacturers or retailers, the fraction of
competitors in a single market that have adopted policies, and the
involvement of retailers in initiating the agreements. 70 Each of
these factors will be examined in turn below.
The presence or absence of manufacturer market power is a
factor, as "[a] manufacturer with market power. . . might use
resale price maintenance to give retailers an incentive not to sell
6 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715-16.
65 Id. at 2715.
66
Id. at 2716 ("If the consumer can then buy the product from a retailer that
discounts because it has not spent capital providing services or developing a
quality reputation, the high-service retailer will lose sales to the discounter,
forcing it to cut back its services to a level lower than consumers would
otherwise prefer. Minimum resale price maintenance alleviates the problem
because it prevents the discounter from undercutting the service provider.").
67 Id. (noting that for new products, "if markets can be penetrated by using
resale price maintenance there is a procompetitive effect").
68 Id. at 2713 (procompetitive effects that are positive in the rule of reason
balance).
69
Id. at 2717 (improper uses); see id. at 2719-20 ("factors . . . relevant to the
injuiry").
Id. at 2717.

98
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the products of smaller rivals or new entrants."" Market power of
the retailer is also a factor, as a powerful retailer "might request
resale price maintenance to forestall innovation in distribution that
decreases costs."7 2 In contrast, "[i]f a retailer lacks market power,
manufacturers likely can sell their goods through rival retailers.""
The second situational factor the Leegin Court suggested is the
proportion of competing firms in a given marketplace making use
of minimum resale price maintenance agreements. 74 These
agreements are more likely to have anticompetitive effects if used
extensively in a market, and the Court stated they "should be
subject to more careful scrutiny .. . if many competing
manufacturers adopt the practice." In particular, with light usage
of resale price maintenance, "there is little likelihood it is
facilitating a manufacturer cartel, for a cartel then can be undercut
by rival manufacturers." 6 Similar competitive pressures
discourage retail cartels" in markets where resale price
maintenance is rare.
A third and final factor the Leegin Court suggested is the
involvement of retailers in initiating the minimum resale price
maintenance policy. 79 The Court emphasized that when vertical
n Id.; see also id at 2720 (noting "if a manufacturer
lacks market power,
there is less likelihood it can use the practice to keep competitors away from
distribution
outlets").
72
Id. at 2717.
7 Id. at 2720.
74 Id. at 2719 (noting that the presence of manufacturers not using minimum
resale price maintenance provides inter-brand competitive options to
consumers).
7 Id.
76

d
77 A

cartel exists when competing firms "replace independent decisions with

an agreement on price, output, or related matters."
HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L.

SOLow,

2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA,

ANTITRUST LAW:

ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

AN

ANALYSIS OF

405a, at 28 (3d ed. 2007)

(defining cartels).
78 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2719 (noting that "a retailer cartel is unlikely when
only a single manufacturer in a competitive market uses resale price
maintenance" and that "competition would divert consumers to lower priced
substitutes and eliminate any gains ... from .. . price-fixing").
7
Id. at 2717.
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restraints are used to implement retail cartels, they should be
treated the same as horizontal restraints, which are still considered
per se illegal.s Evidence that retailers advocated for the minimum
resale price policy suggests an impermissible restraint."' However,
if "a manufacturer adopted the policy independent of retailer
pressure, the restraint is less likely to promote anticompetitive

conduct."8 2
Together, these three factors provide guidance on
procompetitive justifications that courts should consider under the
rule of reason as well as situations where careful judicial attention
is warranted.83 In considering the Leegin case, amici curiae urged
the Court to adopt intermediate standards between a rule of reason
and a per se prohibition.84 Such intermediate standards could
address particular practices known to have anticompetitive
effects." The Court rejected this approach, however, and stressed
that the factors it listed are only part of a rule of reason analysis.8 6

80

Id. (noting per se unlawfulness of horizontal agreements and vertical
agreements operating as horizontal cartels "need to be held unlawful under the
rule of reason").
81 Id. at 2719.
82

id.

See infra Part III.A.4 for a discussion of the implications of these factors on
online retailers.
84 Brief for William S. Comanor and Frederic M. Scherer
as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party at 8-10, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480), 2007
WL 173679 [hereinafter Comanor and Scherer Brief] (arguing for "quick look"
tests that would shift presumption of competitive effect).
81 See
id.
86 See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2719 (before listing factors,
calling it "a realistic
83

objective" for lower courts to be "diligent in eliminating . . . anticompetitive

uses" via the rule of reason). The Supreme Court's insistence on the rule of
reason here is important for logical consistency with its posture that the rule of
reason is the default Sherman § 1 rule and per se illegal is the exception, and
that the rule of reason is favorable to the common law adaptive Sherman
doctrine used to avoid stare decisis concerns. See id. at 2712-13 (describing
preference for rule of reason over per se rules); id. at 2720-21 (noting "the rule
of reason has implemented this common-law approach").
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3. Lessonsfrom the Rule ofReason Elsewhere in Sherman Act
Jurisprudence
In moving to a rule of reason standard in Leegin, the Supreme
Court was not inventing a new standard but rather adopting one
that "is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice
restrains trade in violation of [Sherman Act] section 1."87 This is
not to say per se rules are altogether gone, as per se prohibitions
remain against practices such as horizontal price fixing and
agreeing to divide markets, but the Court views these per se rules
as the exception." A shift from a per se rule to a rule of reason for
a particular type of restraint is not novel, and the Supreme Court
made a similar shift for non-price vertical restraints in 1977" and

for vertical maximum price restraints in 1997.90 Yet, in the case of
maximum price restraints, very little case law exists invalidating
restraints under the rule of reason.9 1 Because maximum price
restraints, by definition, force prices down, establishing how the
restraint harms competition is difficult.9 2
In contrast to maximum price restraints, the rule of reason
standard for non-price vertical restraints established in GTE
Sylvania has been applied in a number of cases." Even so, the
courts are split on whether to apply single or multi-step tests when
applying the rule of reason in this context.9 4 Some circuits apply a
7

Id. at 2712.

" Id. at 2713.
89 See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
90 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
9' BAURER & PAGE, supra note 31, § 12.8, at 198 (noting "there is no postKhan reported case to date in which a plaintiff has successfully challenged
maximum resale price maintenance"). Based on a review of cases citing Khan,
the conclusion reached by Baurer and Page regarding the lack of cases appears
to hold five years after publication of the treatise volume.
92 See Mathias v. Daily News, L.P., 152 F. Supp. 2d 465, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(noting, in the context of procompetitive effects under the rule of reason, that
"[a]t a basic level, maximum resale price maintenance may be consumerfriendly, as the practice evidences a manufacturer's desire to keep prices below
a stated point and closer to competitive levels").
9 See BAURER & PAGE, supra note 31, § 12.12 (noting dozens of postSylvania decisions).
94
Id. § 12.12, at 212-13.
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holistic balancing test, where all competitive factors are weighed."
Other circuits use a two-step balancing test, where the plaintiff
must first meet a threshold requirement--demonstrating the
defendant has market power with respect to the product-before
the court will weigh competitive factors.96 Lastly, still other
circuits employ a three-step test, sequentially seeking: (1) proof
from the plaintiff of "an actual adverse effect on competition";
(2) proof from the defendant of a procompetitive justification; and
(3) proof from the plaintiff of a less restrictive means to
accomplish the procompetitive effect." It remains to be seen
whether these variations of applied rule of reason tests will become
standard for minimum resale price maintenance cases. Early
indications show that they will become standard. For example, the
Total Benefits court, acting post-Leegin, pointed to a similar threestep test as applicable to minimum pricing cases.98 In any case, the
test a court applies will affect how difficult it will be for a
minimum resale price maintenance plaintiff to meet its burden of
proof. In particular, while market power99 is always a rule of
reason factor,'oo tests requiring its demonstration as a threshold
issue give market power more weight compared to other factors.
95
96 Id. § 12.12, at 212-13 & n.177 (noting use by the Third and Ninth Circuits).
Id. § 12.12, at 212 & n.175 (noting use by the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits).
97 Id. § 12.12, at 213 & n.179 (noting use in the Second Circuit); 2 JOSEPH P.
BAUER & WILLIAM H. PAGE, KINTNER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 25 n.17

9

(Supp. 2004) (noting use in the Fourth Circuit). But cf 8 AREEDA &
1645a (characterizing the three-step test as
HOVENKAMP, supra note 39,
standard but suggesting the level of structure for tests advances as courts
become more familiar with a particular sort of restraint).
98 Total Benefits Planning Agency Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
No. 1:05CV519, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53862, at *16 (S.D. Ohio July 25,
2007); see also supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
99 The definition of market power is not unequivocally clear in this Sherman
context, but can be thought of as the extent to which a company can take actions
beyond the ability expected in a competitive situation. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 124 (2d ed. 2001); see also 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP &

SOLOW, supra note 77, T 501 (defining market power). Concentration of firms
in the market is a related concern. See POSNER, supra,at 124-25.
100 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712
(2007) (listing market power as a rule of reason factor).
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Affording market power such weight is consistent with the Leegin
opinion."o0

Some evidence suggests that evaluation under a rule of reason
standard can result in a practice being de facto legal. 10 2 This has
been the result of the application of the rule of reason in the
vertical maximum price context." Briefs supporting the
respondent-retailer in Leegin cite the high cost of rule of reason
litigation as discouraging otherwise meritorious claims.'"
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that a greater fraction"o' of
minimum resale price maintenance programs will go unchallenged
under the Leegin rule of reason.
4. Online Retailers in Rule ofReason: FacingMore Restrictions
The preceding sections have analyzed the Leegin rule of reason
standard. This section focuses on questions of how minimum
resale price maintenance under the new standard may affect online
retailers. First, this section will discuss the three procompetitive
impacts listed by the Supreme Court in Leegin: providing a
margin for provision of services, preventing free riding by
discounters on full service retailers, and allowing for incubation of
new products.'
Next, this section will review the situational
factors' the Court suggests for informing rule of reason analysis.

01 See id. at 2713 (noting "market power is a ... significant consideration");

see also id. at 2717 (describing market power of manufacturer or retailer as a
concerning situation).
102 BAURER & PAGE, supra note 31, § 9.7, at 12; see also Thomas C. Arthur, A
Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the Federal
Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 349-50 (2000).

See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
104 Brief of Amicus Curiae Consumer Federation of America in Support of
Respondent at 21-22, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 621853
[hereinafter Consumer Federation Brief]; Anderson Economic Group Brief,
supra note 17, at 7.
1os While the cost of litigation serves to discourage challenging minimum
resale price maintenance programs, the overall number of programs challenged
may still go up due to the increased overall use of the programs by
manufacturers.
1o6 See supra notes 65-67 and
accompanying text.
107 See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying
text.
103

FALL 2007]

Minimum Resale Price Maintenance

103

Finally, this section will analyze the general impact of minimum
resale price maintenance in a market.
When the Court discusses minimum resale price maintenance
as a tool to provide margins that promote provision of services, it
speaks of "fine showrooms, . . . product demonstrations, or ...

knowledgeable employees,"' which immediately brings to mind a
traditional brick-and-mortar store. While it is certainly possible for
one online retail store to offer more services than another,109
perhaps by providing detailed product information websites and a
knowledgeably staffed hotline, it is hard to envision these services
comparing to the cost of traditional retail services. At minimum,
allowing manufacturers to adopt minimum resale price policies to
provide a margin for the provision of services disfavors retail
channel diversity, as such a margin must be adequate for the most
Online retailers
efficient retailer in the least efficient channel.'
may have lower overhead and greater efficiency, so they stand to
lose under this analysis.
The Supreme Court further provides that combating free riding
is a procompetitive use of minimum resale price maintenance."'
Online retailers are often accused of free riding on the services
provided by their traditional brick-and-mortar competitors." 2 The
free riding concern is not without critics, including economists and

'08 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715. Free riding can be characterized as a positive
externality issue, where benefits flowing from a retail program are not fully
harnessed by a retailer, leading to less provision of the program than socially
desirable. See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 39,

T 1613b, at 153.

109 Indeed, price dispersion in online retail stores suggests varying levels of
services. See Ancarani & Shankar, supra note 5, at 185.
n0 Note that if the manufacturer created a dual pricing policy with an online
price different from its traditional retail price, one price would have to be higher
than the other. It follows that consumers would learn that one channel's prices
could never be competitive with the other channel's prices.
" Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2716.
112 See, e.g., Bakos, supra note 5, at 76-77; Dennis W. Carlton & Judith A.
Chevalier, Free Riding and Sales Strategiesfor the Internet, 49 J. INDUS. ECON.
441 (2001); Sebastian Van Baal & Christian Dach, Free Riding and Customer
Retention Across Retailers' Channels, J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING, Spring

2005, at 75, 77-78.
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others who are skeptical of how often it actually occurs."' It is
also conceivable that some free riding occurs in the opposite
direction, with consumers using the information resources of an
online retailer before purchasing from a local brick-and-mortar
retailer.114 Nevertheless, free riding is a plausible justification for
resale price maintenance policies adverse to online retailers.
The new product protection procompetitive rationale"' also has
e-commerce implications. In particular, as e-commerce allows
manufacturers to connect with distant customers, direct sales from
manufacturer to end consumer are more feasible. Resale price
maintenance is inapplicable to products sold directly from
manufacturer to consumer,"16 allowing the manufacturer to freely
set prices necessary to assist a product launch. If a manufacturer
can protect the price of a new product without resorting to direct
sales, it may be encouraged to introduce more new products in
traditional retail channels, reducing the number of products
appearing exclusively on Internet direct sales sites. In the general
case, both traditional and online retailers are likely to find utility in
protective margins as they insert the product into inventory and
undertake promotion of the product. As such, the new product
113 See Comanor and Scherer Brief, supra note 84, at 6-7
(noting "skepticism
in the economic literature" regarding the frequency of free riding); Brief of the
American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 19
n.25, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 621856 [hereinafter
American Antitrust Institute Brief] (expressing skepticism about product
categories capable of sustaining free riding (citing 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 39, 1601e, at 13)).
114 See Consumer Federation Brief, supra note 104, at 18; see also American
Antitrust Institute Brief, supra note 113, at 19 n.24 (claiming Internet
competition has improved brick-and-mortar efficiency, which should not be
considered harmful).
" Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977)
("[M]anufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to
induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of
capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to
the consumer.").
116 See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 39,
1622c (stating that resale
price maintenance is clearly inapplicable to direct sales from manufacturer to
consumer, but noting complexities if other intermediaries play some role in the
transaction).
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protection rationale does not seem to be particularly problematic
for the ordinary online retailer.
Among the situational factors the Supreme Court highlights for
examination by lower courts,'"7 both lack of market power and lack
of concentrated resale price maintenance policies support an
inference of an allowable restraint. Market power is difficult to
establish,"' and few industries have high concentrations of
minimum price maintenance."'
With some circuits favoring
20
market power as a threshold issue,1 difficulty with market power
demonstration may be particularly problematic for a complaining
retailer, resulting in many minimum resale price maintenance
agreements being upheld. Accordingly, both online and traditional
discount retailers can expect to be impacted as fewer minimum
resale price maintenance policies are invalidated.
The other situational factor, the suspect nature of retailerinduced resale price maintenance, 2 ' should operate to the benefit
of online retailers.
Conceivably, traditional retailers might
pressure manufacturers for minimum resale price maintenance to
combat their online competitors. Online retailers should not be
overly concerned about this possibility due to the Court's
recognition of the problematic nature of retailer induced vertical
restraints and their similarity to per se illegal horizontal

restraints.122
Regardless of how these particular factors impact online
retailers, the most basic market effect of minimum resale price
See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting consideration
"of 'market power' . . . invites lengthy time-consuming argument among
competing experts, as they seek to apply abstract, highly technical, criteria to
often ill-defined markets"); 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SoLow, supra note 77,
504 (noting the difficulty in technical determination of market power).
119 At least in the short term, markets concentrated with minimum resale price
maintenance agreements are unlikely, as such agreements previously were
illegal. Once businesses can react to the new Leegin rule, this conclusion may
not2 necessarily
hold.
0
1
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying
text.
122 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717 (discussing relationship
of vertical schemes and
horizontal cartels).
117
118
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maintenance is higher prices for consumers.123 Notably, the Leegin
majority expends more effort explaining why higher prices might
not be bad than it does disputing the contention that higher prices
will occur.'2 4 While it is possible to envision situations where
demand for a higher-priced product will not decrease,125 higher
prices will lead to less items purchased by consumers in the
aggregate. 2 6 As a result, online retailers would be burdened both
by reduced access to price competition, if directly restricted by
price policies, and by reduced budgets of customers the retailer has
in common with price-restricted businesses and industries.
Accordingly, should enough resale price maintenance policies be
implemented to cause these higher prices, an adverse impact on
discount online retailers will occur.
Discount online retailers competing on price are harmed by
policies that reduce their ability to set prices. The Leegin rule of
reason standard makes minimum resale price maintenance policies
adverse to these retailers legally available to manufacturers. If
enough manufacturers elect to implement these policies, online
discounting, and thus, online retailing in general stand to be greatly
reduced.

OVERSTREET, supra note 42, at 160 (noting empirical studies showing
increasing price and that "both procompetitive and anticompetitive economic
theories of [resale price maintenance] predict ... [higher] product prices"); see
also Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2728 (Breyer, J., dissenting); 8 AREEDA &
HOvENKAMP, supra note 39, 1604b, at 40 ("Indeed, the restraint that did not
hold a product's price above the level that would otherwise prevail would be
unnecessary; its very purpose is to prevent price cutting.").
124 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718-19 (noting better service might compensate for
higher prices and that, beyond resale price maintenance, "[m]any decisions ...
lead to higher prices").
125 In addition to the concept of consumers placing a value on services, simple
price inelasticity of demand and poor substitutes will lead to this result. See
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 273-75 (6th ed.
2003) (discussing elasticity of demand).
126 The exception would be if the additional revenue is flowing back to the
consumer, so the median consumer is made wealthier, in absolute dollar terms,
by the higher prices. This inflationary outcome is distant and speculative.
123
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B. PredictionsofReal-World Usage ofResale Price Maintenance
While manufacturers may enjoy much broader legal access to
minimum resale price maintenance policies as a result of the
Supreme Court's decision in Leegin, this decision does not mean
that manufactures will elect to implement these policies. Indeed, a
number of factors, as discussed in this section, support the
conclusion that such policies will not see widespread use. If true,
this outcome would prevent Leegin from greatly harming discount
e-commerce. First, history from the fair trade period suggests
many companies will not implement such policies.'2 7 Second, the
previous availability of resale price maintenance under the Colgate
doctrine reduces the scope of new options Leegin affords
suppliers.'28
Finally, substantial marketplace and efficiency
incentives exist discouraging manufacturers from using resale
price maintenance.'29
1. Evidence From Fair Trade History
During the fair trade period, minimum resale price
maintenance was legal in many states.'
The Supreme Court in
Leegin points out that during the peak of resale price maintenance,
only one percent of manufacturers used this practice, affecting
between four and ten percent of retail goods."' While this is strong
evidence that resale price maintenance is a special-case business
tool, Justice Stephen Breyer, in his dissent, observes that ten
percent of retail sales still amounts to $300 billion in goods.'32
Arguably, this history provides assurance that minimum resale
price maintenance is not likely to become the norm, but it does not
conclusively foreclose the possibility that these policies will harm
online retailers.
127 See infra Part III.B.1.

See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.3.
130 See supra text accompanying notes
42-44.
"3'Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2725
(2007) ("It is also of note that during this time 'when the legal environment ...
was most favorable for [resale price maintenance], no more than a tiny fraction
of manufacturers ever employed [resale price maintenance] contracts.'
(brackets in original) (quoting OVERSTREET, supra note 42, at 6)).
132 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2735 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128

129
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2. Colgate Utilization: Minimum Resale Price Maintenance is
Already Available
Unilateral resale price maintenance has been legal under
Colgate almost as long as bilateral resale price maintenance was
illegal under Dr. Miles."' It is reasonable to conclude that at least
some manufacturers desiring a uniform retail price have already
been enforcing one under Colgate. As the facts of Leegin
demonstrate, unilateral programs always run the risk of being
found bilateral.'34 The implementation of a legally effective
unilateral program can also be quite costly."' In the end, Colgate
utilization is most likely suggestive of the types of companies most
interested in using minimum resale price maintenance policies.
3. Disincentives to Resale Price Maintenance
Both inherent efficiency considerations and the realities of the
modem retail marketplace create substantial disincentives to
First, even if
implementation of resale price maintenance.
consumer free riding is an issue for a given product, the interests of
the manufacturer may not be sufficiently aligned with the retailers
to cause the manufacturer to take action. The consumer is not free
riding off the manufacturer, but is instead free riding off a retailer,
thereby imposing a cost on the retailer. If this retailer continues to
sell the product, the cost will not be passed on to the
manufacturer,"' who still derives the benefit from the discounter's
sale. In effect, this is a form of price discrimination, allowing the
manufacturer to capture the sales of marginal consumers who

See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
1' Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712 (describing Leegin defending its policy as a
unilateral restraint); see also Christopher S. Finnerty, Resale Price Maintenance
and Long Term Distribution Strategy, INDUSTRY WK., Aug. 20, 2007,
http://www.industryweek.com/ReadArticle.aspx?ArticlelD=14816 (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (characterizing Leegin as
providing a strategic fallback defense that makes unilateral policies less risky).
13 PING Brief, supra note 9, at 9-10 (noting the lengths to which PING goes
to avoid retailer assent).
of continued sales is particularly realistic if the
136 The assumption
manufacturer has clout in the market with products that would be conspicuously
absent.
133
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would otherwise go elsewhere. The manufacturer is effectively
free riding off its own higher-end retailers.
More importantly, pricing efficiency disfavors resale price
maintenance. 3 7 The Supreme Court notes in Leegin that "[t]he
difference between the price a manufacturer charges retailers and
the price retailers charge consumers represents part of the
manufacturer's cost of distribution, which, like any other cost, the
manufacturer usually desires to minimize.""' The court further
explains that "retailers, not the manufacturer, gain from higher
retail prices."' 39 Retailers are inherently closer to consumers and
are therefore in a better position to respond to market changes.
When the manufacturer acts as a central pricing authority, there is
a risk of a sluggish response to changes in market conditions,
harming sales in a dynamic market.'40 The speed at which fast
systems move information between parties comes at a cost. Due to
these pricing efficiency concerns, competition among retailers is a
valuable tool to the overall competitiveness of the brand. For this
reason, manufacturers may prefer to leave retail pricing decisions
to the retailers.
Additionally, some conditions in the present-day retailing
market discourage the use of minimum resale price maintenance.
In particular, large discount retailers such as Wal-Mart have
137 See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718-19. In its amicus curiae brief, the American
Antitrust Institute challenged the notion that a manufacturer would adopt resale
price maintenance only if the price would be efficient, suggesting that retailer
pressure could influence a manufacturer to look beyond efficiency. American
Antitrust Institute Brief, supra note 113, at 15-16. The risk of this retailer
pressure should be reduced, as the Leegin Court was clear that retailer
involvement was improper and analogous to a proscribed horizontal agreement.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717; see also supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.

"3 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718.
39

Id. at 2719 (also noting that "[a] manufacturer has no incentive to
overcompensate retailers with unjustified margins").
140 See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, 1 1632c4, at 321 (noting risk
that resale price maintenance can cause "long delayed" price corrections by
manufacturers). This efficiency concern was advanced to the Court as a reason
not to abandon the Dr. Miles per se rule. American Antitrust Institute Brief,
supra note 113, at 14-15. However, it applies equally well as a practical
constraint on the self-aware, efficiency-oriented manufacturer.
1
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sizable market power.14 ' Specifically, Wal-Mart has a history of
opposition to resale price maintenance dating back to at least 1982
when executive S. Robson Walton expressed concern that
overruling the per se rule could damage the young business. 14 2 In
the present day, Wal-Mart is no longer a developing business, but
one with a reputation for demanding efficiency and low cost from
its suppliers.143 Wal-Mart has a professed interest in driving the
price down for the end user,'" in contrast to a retailer who might
pad margins via resale price maintenance. It would be reasonable
to expect Wal-Mart to be hostile to resale price maintenance,
potentially to the extent of refusing to carry products under such
agreements. While manufacturers are not fond of Wal-Mart's
policies, few are willing to give up the major retail channel WalMart represents.14 5 Online retailers selling the same products as
Wal-Mart and other large discount retailers have reason to be less
concerned about resale price maintenance as those discounters
exert pressure on manufacturers. This, combined with other
marketplace and business efficiency factors, reduces the practical
impact of a legal rule more favorable to minimum resale price
maintenance.
141

See Misha Petrovic & Gary G. Hamilton, Making Global Markets: Wal-

Mart and Its Suppliers, in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 107, 109 (noting observations of a shift in market
power from manufacturers to large retailers).
142 S. Robson Walton, Antitrust, RPM, and the Big Brands: Discounting in
Small Town America, 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 81, 82 (1982) (calling
resale price maintenance "a great danger to our business" and warning that
"when we lose the ability to price our merchandise . . . we've lost the ability to

compete").
143 See Petrovic & Hamilton, supra note 141, at 118 (noting Wal-Mart's role
in pushing suppliers to use efficient supply chain management); RICHARD
VEDDER & WENDELL Cox, THE WAL-MART REVOLUTION: How BIG-Box
STORES BENEFIT CONSUMERS, WORKERS, AND THE ECONOMY 114-15 (2006)

(commenting on existence of "plenty of anecdotal evidence confirming that
Wal-Mart is very aggressive in demanding low prices from its suppliers").
144 Wal-Mart Stores:
Pricing Philosophy, http://www.walmartstores.com/
GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg-258 (last visited Sept. 28, 2007) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
145 See Chad Terhune, Coca-Cola Feared Wal-Mart Pressure In Delivery
Shift, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2006, at B6 (explaining that Coca-Cola changed
distribution out of fear of Wal-Mart harming the Powerade brand).
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IV. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc
v. PSKS, Inc. announced a notable shift in the law of minimum
resale price maintenance by implementing a rule of reason
standard. In contrast to the former per se rule, the rule of reason
stands to allow many minimum resale price maintenance policies
to survive legal scrutiny. Retailers that compete for sales based on
price, including many online retailers, risk being disadvantaged if
their suppliers choose to enact pricing policies. Procompetitive
effects identified as permissible, such as preventing free riding on
services of a competitor, squarely target a number of online
businesses.
While legal barriers to minimum resale price maintenance have
been largely removed, practical and economic barriers still remain.
Both the history of resale price maintenance and the modem focus
on efficiency in supply tend to suggest minimum resale price
maintenance will remain a niche business tool without widespread
use in the marketplace. Some online merchants will experience
difficulty, but many will be able to continue offering bargains and
convenience to shoppers around the world. Fears that the Leegin
decision signals the death of online discounting are premature.
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